

gencies are another such factor: a leader may decide it is time to bargain, but how can he ensure his orders are respected by all his fanatical followers, scattered in the jungle with their defective wireless sets?

The nature of the battlefield and of guerrilla warfare contribute also. Who can say what constitutes victory in such conflicts? The financing of insurgencies through trade in drugs or oil or diamonds may make it more attractive for some to continue a civil war than to end it. And the frequent imbalance between the sides in power, resources, and goals, according to King, makes an approach to compromise and negotiation less likely than when, as in the case of wars between states, a rough symmetry often exists between the belligerents. Finally, in the absence of enforcement machinery that will ensure the enduring commitment of the parties to a settlement, the security anxieties of the parties to a civil war sometimes cannot be quieted short of the partition of the disputed territory. (King cites on this point Chaim Kaufmann's conclusion that only eight of 27 ethnic civil wars since 1944 ended in a negotiated settlement that did not lead to the partition of the state.)

All this strongly suggests that peacekeepers should be utterly without illusions about the difficulties they are getting themselves into. The end of the cold war has indeed

drawn the sting from certain regional quarrels around the world and made the parties more amenable to compromise. But this serves only to underline that outsiders should try to see the wars that remain as the belligerents see them and not according to their own preconceptions. In this way, King suggests, those who are anxious to seek peace may hope more confidently to identify the incentives to continued violence and the disincentives to compromise in particular situations, to assess realistically their own capacity to influence events, and to devise peacemaking strategies accordingly. Sometimes this will mean swallowing bitter compromises – of the kind, for example, that permits the Ratko Mladices of the world to sun themselves on Montenegrin beaches when they should be facing war crimes tribunals. At best, peacemaking and peacekeeping in post-cold war circumstances will be a demanding, dangerous business. That will not come as news to the more than 50,000 United Nations peacekeepers deployed around the world.

KEYSTONE IN THE ARCH

Ukraine in the emerging security environment of central and eastern Europe

Sherman W. Garnett

New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997, 145pp, US\$14.95

At the beginning of the 'nineties, when new and unforeseen horizons were opening everywhere in central and eastern Europe, much was made in Canada of the fact that one Canadian in ten is of eastern European ancestry. The links between Canada and Ukraine were cited as a leading example of Canada's eastern connections, given the size of the Ukrainian community in Canada. Yet close to a decade later, the significance of these connections still fails to make more than a confused and unfocussed impression in Canada outside a small circle in government, the universities, and business. This is notwithstanding the emphatic support of the present Canadian government for an early and extensive expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as a result of which Canadians, whether they entirely realize it or not, have now joined in extending the security guarantee in article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to the borders of Ukraine, while Ukraine itself has sought to conclude with NATO arrangements that amount to 'everything short of article 5.'

Considering its size, its strategic location, and its internal and external problems, there is a clear need for accessible analysis of Ukraine's situation and its significance for Western interests. This book by Sherman Garnett, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, thus helps fill a notable gap. The keystone metaphor of the title is in itself an invitation to fresh thinking. With discussion of the expansion of NATO focussed largely on the Russian reaction, a more conventional view might have located the key to the security debate elsewhere. But Garnett asserts flatly that 'Ukraine is the keystone in the arch of the emerging security environment in Central and Eastern Europe.' Certainly little in the flood of coverage of the NATO expansion debate in the press would tend to such a conclusion.

The author's review of Ukraine's record as an independent state is therefore all the more useful. Ukraine has barely existed in modern history as a sovereign country, and not at all within its present boundaries. It is less ethnically and culturally uniform than many Canadians might suppose – less so than Poland, for example – for all the historic richness and strength of the Ukrainian language and culture. At independence, Ukraine inherited internally a stricken economy and externally a set of troublesome problems with its neighbours, especially Russia. These included the question of Ukraine's nuclear future, both military and civil, the fate of the Crimea, the disposition of the Black Sea fleet, and the evolution of the Commonwealth of Inde-

pendent States (CIS). Many observers in the first years of Ukraine's independence doubted that the country could survive its inheritance of internal and external problems.

Garnett draws attention to the respectable progress Ukraine has made, despite these problems, towards a more secure independence. Internally, the government has pursued economic reform, albeit after a very slow start. The Ukrainian and Russo-Ukrainian communities continue to manage the country under a reasonable accommodation, although the future of the Crimea remains a source of insecurity. Externally, relations with Russia have been managed by both sides with a degree of pragmatism that has kept the contentious agenda under control, even if issues like the future of the CIS, where Ukrainian and Russian perspectives conflict, and the division of the Baltic fleet - admittedly of dwindling military importance but still symbolically sensitive - remain unresolved.

Above all, Ukraine has become a non-nuclear weapons state. The author devotes a separate chapter to describing how, after a difficult beginning, Ukraine, Russia, and the United States successfully brought about the withdrawal to Russia of the nuclear weapons Ukraine had inherited as a successor state of the

Soviet Union, the accession of Ukraine to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and compensation to Ukraine in the form of security agreements and technical and economic aid. Ukraine has become, Garnett points out, the third largest recipient of United States foreign aid as a consequence of these developments.

In the author's view, the scale of United States assistance bespeaks a broad and laudable but insufficient engagement. He argues that the Western allies generally, and not only the United States, should cease to deal with Ukraine on the basis of ad hoc solutions to problems as they arise. He favours extending the commitment the United States has already made in order to achieve the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine, based upon a coherent strategic view of long-term Western interests in Ukraine's stability and success - a commitment he believes the Western allies generally should share. He concludes that the relatively successful outcome of Ukraine's independence so far has been as much a matter of good luck as good management; and that, so far as it is in the hands of Western friends of Ukraine to influence the future, they should cease to count on good luck as much as they have in the past. While Garnett directs his advice largely to an audience in the United States and Western Europe,

the relevance for Canada hardly needs to be underlined.

THE WORLD AND  
YUGOSLAVIA'S WARS

Edited by Richard H. Ullman  
New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996, 220pp, US\$18.95 paper

Nine distinguished United States scholars, under the editorial leadership of Richard Ullman of Princeton, examine the part played by the principal outside actors in the drama of the former Yugoslavia. Few emerge with credit. Neither the major countries involved nor the United Nations and its agencies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European regional organizations escape rough handling by the various authors. Here and there, modest consolation emerges. The cautious realism of the administration of President George Bush receives some recognition. The authors also recognize that humanitarian efforts, however bungled, did save lives and limit destruction. But in general, the authors confirm the now-familiar picture: the descent of a country which, for all its flaws, was reasonably united, prosperous, and civilized into a chaos of destruction and barbarity - a chaos created by insiders but which outsiders were powerless to prevent and seemed at times to make worse. Since this is a book

about the outsiders, the Yugoslav actors appear only at the margin of the analysis. The authors focus their attention on why the major countries and international organizations failed to intervene soon enough or effectively enough to forestall tragedy. They obviously believe the international community could have done much better, although evidently not to the point of preserving a country so many of its own people seemed bent on destroying. An intriguing analysis of United States and European public opinion by Richard Sobel suggests the West's real failure was of political leadership rather than popular will. A review of the daunting problems of peacemaking and reconstruction by Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes foresees prospects only slightly less discouraging than the pursuit of continued war and destruction would have presented.

TRIUMPH OF THE LACK OF WILL

International diplomacy and the  
Yugoslav war  
James Gow  
New York: Columbia University Press,  
1997, xii, 341pp, US\$29.50

Under the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when Austria Hungary took over the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Ottoman empire, they moved in an army